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ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST 
Kenneth S. Carlston* and James M. Treece** 
PUBLIC control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open 
competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt 
that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of 
the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, 
private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free 
markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives. 
J. PLURALISTIC COMPETITION: THE TRADITIONAL GOAL 
Decision-making in the public control of business has generally 
proceeded in the light of the teachings of economists concerning the 
forms of competition. Perfect conditions of competition are said to 
include a market with many actors, · both buyers and sellers, who 
have perfect knowledge and mobility and who deal in undiffer-
entiated items. A relatively pure form of competition is expected to 
exist even where market actors have neither perfect knowledge nor 
perfect mobility.1 Less pure forms of competition result from acer-
tain amount of product differentiation and a resulting quantum of 
control-perhaps unexercised control-over price. It is generally 
agreed that as the number of sellers decreases in a given market and 
as the degree of product differentiation in that market increases, 
there is an increasing probability that an impure form of competi-
tion is regulating market action. It is usually assumed that there 
is a direct correlation between the degree to which competition in 
the market in fact approaches the ideal of highly pluralistic competi-
tion and the likelihood of satisfaction of consumer wants at the low-
est attainable price.2 
A. Concern Over the Number of Sellers-A Case 
of Misplaced Emphasis 
Of all the foregoing indicators of competition, the easiest to ob-
serve in actual operation is the number of sellers in a given market. 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed. 
•• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University.-Ed. 
1. See, e.g., CHAMBERUN, Tm: THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 3-10 (7th ed. 
1956). 
2. Obviously there is no generally applicable definition of competition. "What is 
'inter-industry' competition to one man is 'late-stage monopoly capitalism' to another." 
Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. REv. 413, 
4!10 (1964). 
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It should come as no surprise if an agency concerned with maintain-
ing competition in an oligopolistic market performs its task in large 
part on the basis of a nose count of sellers.3 In two recent bank 
merger decisions, the Supreme Court not only determined the num-
ber of sellers in the relevant market, but in large part also used 
this count as the basis for its decisions to interfere and forestall per-
manent marketing combinations in those markets. In United States 
v. First Nat'l Bank b Trust Co. (the Lexington Bank case),4 the 
Court refused in a specific setting to permit a six-seller market to be 
reduced to a five-seller market, and in its earlier opinion in United 
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,5 it identified the general market 
setting in which it would assume that the loss of even one seller as 
a result of a merger would constitute, actually or potentially, a sub-
stantial lessening of competition in that market. 
Concern over the number of sellers in a market obviously repre-
sents, among other things, a desire that buyers be provided with a 
wide choice among sellers in the market. However, the existence of 
a wide range of transaction opportunities is a better guide to the 
functioning of competition in a market than the mere existence of 
a large number of sellers. The operation of a cartel illustrates this 
point. A market characterized by many sellers operating as a cartel 
offers the consumer no real choice of transaction opportunities be-
cause no seller is functioning as an independent economic unit; 
rather, the managements of the several units have pooled their firms' 
decision-making operations and have substituted the group or cartel 
decision for their independent decisions. In the cartel situation, the 
consumer has no real choice because the cartel has programmed its 
members to give a uniform response to a buyer's invitation to enter 
into a transaction. 
Predictably, where the cartel decision supplants decisions of the 
individual member firm in such mc_1.tters as the number of products 
to be produced,6 the price to be charged,7 or the allocation of trans-
action possibilities among sellers8 (by division of customers or terri-
3. "It is the basic premise of [§ 7 of the Clayton Act) ••• that competition 1vill be 
most vital 'when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market 
share.'" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964) (Douglas, 
J., quoting from United States v. Philadelphia Nat1 Bank, 874 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)). 
4. 376 U.S. 665 (1964). 
5. 874 U.S. 321 (1963). 
6. Cf. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596 (1951). 
7. Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram&: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
8. Cf. White Motor Co. v~ United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Addyston Pipe &: Steel 
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899). 
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tories), free competition is considered by the courts to have been dis-
placed as a matter of law. 
Another situation where a large number of sellers in a market 
may give a false appearance of real choice among transaction oppor-
tunities is a market in which consumers, because of physical or 
temporal limitations, can consider the goods or services of only a 
few of the sellers. A submarket can illustrate such a situation, to 
the extent that it does not involve a problem solely of market defi-
nition. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court 
emphasized the fact that well-defined geographic submarkets, such 
as specific cities and their environs, may exist within broad markets.10 
For example, there may be numerous shoe retailers in a particular 
section of the country but only one having an outlet in a particular 
town. Thus, when shoes are needed by consumers in that town and 
transportation to other towns is not feasible, the consumers involved 
have no effective choice of transaction partners.11 
Situations also occur where consumers are confronted with a 
large number of sellers in a given market but find it impractical to 
give consideration to more_ than one or two sellers as potential trans-
action partners. Impulse items provide one example. A consumer 
wishing to buy an item costing less than one tenth of one per cent of 
his weekly income will be likely to buy it at the most convenient 
location rather than to go out of his way to make a conscious choice 
among sellers. Even a prospective buyer who is willing to shop for 
a particular item may not have available the means to test and choose 
among the large number of products presented for his choice. In 
fact, his inadequacy to deal with a bewildering array of merchandise 
may cause him to act irrationally rather than choosing rationally 
from a limited sample of the products available.12 
On the other hand, it is not always clear that the presence of only 
a limited number of sellers in a market means that consumer -choices 
are unacceptably limited. In fact, if there exist potential sellers 
capable of easy and speedy entry into the market, even a single 
seller may provide a consumer with an adequate choice of trans-
action opportunities. Most newsstands provide an example. A typical 
newsstand serves a distinct market area, perhaps a single block, in 
which it is the only seller. However, it provides an adequate choice 
9. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
10. Id. at 336. 
11. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922), 
where the Court recognized that small towns often cannot support more than one dis• 
tributor of a particular line of products. , 
12. Cf. CLARK, COMPETlTION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 75-76, 241-42 (1961). 
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of transaction opportunities to its customers because its failure to 
perform as if effectively limited by competition, as by arbitrarily 
raising prices (even slightly), will be likely to cause another seller 
to invade its territory at once. Such potential competition adequately 
serves the public need for competitively determined prices in both 
markets and submarkets. 
A second illustration of a few sellers providing an adequate 
choice of transaction opportunities to consumers arises when large 
firms P.roduce competing lines or competing products within a line.18 
Meat packers, for example, sell a variety of cuts from a variety of 
animals, all cuts competing with one another. Food packers often 
distribute a variety of products under different brand-names and at 
different prices.14 Large shoe manufacturers provide another ex-
ample, since they frequently organize into separate, competing sell-
ing divisions through which various brands and types of shoes are 
marketed. In durable goods markets, the same seller as a matter 
of course provides economy, standard, and deluxe models of his 
product, thereby offering consumers three distinct transaction possi-
bilities. 
B. Buyer's Conscious Limitation of Transaction Opportunities-
The Requirements Contract 
The preceding examples include instances where consumers are 
indifferent to a large number of sellers in a market because they find 
that their needs for transaction opportunities are served adequately 
by a few. There are still other situations where the correlation be-
tween the number of transaction partners and the welfare of partic-
ular buyers is very slight. In fact, certain types of buyers, including 
many who buy for resale, need to limit their choice of transaction 
partners severely, even to one, for long periods of time. 
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,115 the electric com-
pany contracted to purchase its total requirements of coal for a 
period of twenty years from a single source, thereby foregoing a 
series of choices among other transaction partners for that period. 
The Supreme Court sustained this limitation, pointing out that the 
contract resulted in economic advantage to the buyer.10 The Court 
also noted that the requirements contract guaranteed a constant flow 
13. See, e.g., OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 372-75 (1951). 
14. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 .F,2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3117 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1965). 
15. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
16. Id. at 334. 
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of coal to the utility's boilers for a period long enough to permit 
long-term planning to meet the needs of the utility's customers.17 
Thus, the buyer's decision to substitute an assured supply of coal 
for unlimited choice of transaction partners was considered permissi-
ble, especially where an offsetting benefit to the utility and to its 
customers was apparent. However, to achieve the end of protecting 
the consumer interest in the transaction, the Court had to engage in 
manipulative definition of the relevant market.18 
Permitting decisions by buyers to limit their freedom of choice 
of transaction partners, by entering exclusive dealing arrangements 
or by agreeing to purchase requirements for a substantial period of 
time from a single seller, is fully consistent with reliance upon com-
petition as the market regulator. The basic function of competition 
is to provide buyers with freedom of choice among transaction part-
ners to the end that buyers realize their values. This is a freedom 
which includes the right to decline periodic exercise of choice, where 
such a course of conduct is desirable for the purpose of value 
realization.19 l 
II. EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER INTEREST: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH 
The above situations demonstrate the invalidity of the assump-
tion that highly pluralistic competition should in all cases be the 
ideal model for purposes of public control of business. The thesis of 
this article, however, does not stop at this point. It is submitted that 
the ideal of economic action for purposes of antitrust control should 
be a system which: (I) provides means for consumers to realize their 
values through choice among the widest possible range of products 
and services; (2) results in goods and ·services being offered by sup-
pliers with the greatest economy of means and at prices determined 
by effective competition, which is not necessarily highly pluralistic 
competition; and (3) produces a framework where the ultimate goal 
is the development of the consumer as an individual and a person-
ality instead of satisfying the marginal wants of the economists' 
abstract model of a buyer. Antitrust control should be concerned 
with the consumer interest. The structure of the market is only one 
aspect of the problem of achieving that goal, and attainment· of the 
economists' goal of a perfect market structure should not be reached 
17. Ibid. 
18. See text accompanying notes 52 and 53 infra. 
19. Good reasons for declining periodic exercise of choice might include, in addition 
to an assured source of supply, a promise of an exclusive franchise or the benefits to 
be derived from integration into a dealer system including accounting and advertising 
direction, employee training programs, group insurance, and other similar benefits. 
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at the expense of the consumer. Accordingly, the issues for antitrust 
control should be: Do the questioned market relationships provide 
adequate means for consumer value realization by innovation, mar-
ket research, choice of products and services, efficient use of means, 
and price reductions corresponding to savings in costs? Is there suffi-
cient competition to ensure that this kind of market performance 
will be maintained? Would compulsory movement toward a more 
pluralistic market structure result in any substantial improvement 
in market performance from the standpoint of the foregoing criteria? 
Antitrust control is thus confronted with the question whether 
the interests of consumers will be better served by restructuring 
markets which have few sellers or by permitting such markets to 
operate in a concentrated state. Two kinds of consumption in 
today's organization of industry force such a posing of alternatives 
for decision: government consumption and the consumption of the 
"affluent" consumer. 
Government is at present a "super consumer" which wants space 
conquered, poverty eliminated, and racial economic inequality erad-
icated. Such wants are different both in degree and in kind from the 
consumer wants which direct the classical economic competitive 
model. No combination of consumers having the requisite wealth, 
other than the federal government, could be expected to agree to 
exchange it for pictures of Mars. However, such demands are being 
made by the super consumer. Moreover, the "super demands" of 
government are calling for the combination of quantities of men, 
materials, and machines into producing units which would not· 
otherwise come into being. For example, the federal government, 
through its Chief Executive, recently announced that the United 
States will parallel its lunar landing program with a program ex-
ploring the military potential of men in space.20 
It seems apparent that the demands of the Government for such 
items as manned orbiting laboratories are capable of satisfaction 
only by producing units the output of which will appear in the 
somewhat distant future. Such units have vast reservoirs of special-
ists and vast accumulations of capital, and are directed by profes-
sional managers with due regard for the interests of consumers, la-
bor, stockholders, and the public. Producing units of this sort were 
labeled "metrocorporations"' by Richard Eells.21 Fragmentation of 
industry_so as to leave no seller with an organization capable of satis-
- 20. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 2, col. 2. 
21. See generally EEu.s, THE MEANING OF MODERN BUSINESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF, LARGE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE (1960), . 
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fying the demands of the super consumer is politically and economi-
cally unacceptable, particularly when those demands fall in the cate-
gory of defense. Similarly, to require the super. consumer to deal 
always with multiple sources of supply seems unacceptable, if to do 
so is inefficient or not in accord with the preferences of the super 
consumer. 
A setting in which a super consumer demands, among other 
things, the immediate bridging of space and the systematic elimina-
tion of poverty signals evolution from an economy of scarcity toward 
an economy based on affluence and having an increasing and sub-
stantial number of individual consumers possessed of varying degrees 
of affluence. With respect to the latter group of constantly expanding 
affluent consumers, each with an expanding capacity to demand satis-
faction of non-physical needs,22 the economic and social task for the 
community will become more one of responding to individual desires 
and less one of producing from scarce resources a series of basic 
goods in sufficient quantity. In other words, if the affluent consumer 
in a competitive economy appears in sufficient numbers, he is less 
likely to be perceived by producers as simply a unit in a homoge-
neous mass; he is more likely to be perceived in terms of his indi-
vidual personality. 
The adjustment of the economy to the needs of such a society will 
demand something more than Adam Smith's ideal of many sellers-
small business unit&:-in a market as the optimal mode of economic 
organization. Production on a small scale cannot satisfy many of 
the demands of space-age consumers responding to stimuli from 
laboratories producing new advances in technology and new scientific 
discoveries. Some of the demands generated by affluent space-age 
consumers, whether for natural gas, communications satellites, com-
puters, or atomic kitchen, will, like the demands of the super con-
sumer, be capable of satisfaction only by producing units with the 
capacity of a metrocorporation. 
This is not, of course, to suggest that smaller producing units 
designed to fulfill small segments of demand will not remain a 
vital force in the future. Similarly, those persons charged with pre-
serving to the economy the benefits of competition must continue 
to be concerned with the structure of markets. However, the fore-
going observations ~hould suggest that conceivably the nature of the 
demands of the affluent consumers of the future, along with the na-
ture of the demands of the super-consumer, require the presence in 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1965 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 71324 
(S.D. Cal. 1964), prob. furls. noted, 282 U.S. 806 (1965). 
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the market of super producers. It is also suggested that agencies 
charged with maintaining competition should adopt a perspective 
in addition to that of the neo-classic model of highly pluralistic com-
petition in order that an opportunity might be preserved for the 
timely growth and development of such super producers. 
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUING INSISTENCE ON 
PLURALISTIC COMPETITION 
If recent Supreme Court pronouncements provide a guide, the 
trend in the enforcement of competition is toward increasing and 
exclusive reliance upon a pluralistic model of a competitive market 
-one with many sellers, preferably independent and locally owned-
against which to measure challenged marketing arrangements. In 
the Brown Shoe case, for example, the Supreme Court construed 
section 7 of the Clayton Act to prohibit a merger of two corpora-
tions the result of which was an enterprise both manufacturing 
shoes and selling a large portion of its output through wholly owned 
or controlled retail outlets.23 The merger was condemned as reflect-
ing an undue tendency toward concentration of economic power in 
the hands of a few sellers in the markets for men's, women's, and 
children's shoes. 
The shoe industry, at the time the Court was analyzing it, had 
over eight hundred shoe manufacturers; it thus had a market struc-
ture "as close to pure competition as is possible outside a classroom 
model."24 Nevertheless, the Court was convinced that the number 
of competitors was being systematically reduced by a series of 
mergers. Apparently the Court became convinced that a market 
structure comprising eight hundred manufacturers of shoes is eco-
nomically more desirable than one involving any lesser number, 
although it would seem that as few as fifty competitors would provide 
a market structure in which competition would be an effective 
regulator. 
The Court also relied upon a pluralistic norm in analyzing the 
vertical aspects of the Brown Shoe acquisition. There, too, a trend 
among shoe manufacturers to acquire control of existing retail out-
lets was given as the basis for invalidating the acquisition. The Court 
emphasized the fact that the merger created "a large national chain 
which is integrated with a manufacturing operation,"25 and pointed 
out that "the retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating 
23. See 370 U.S. at 297. 
24. Bork &· Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 363, 371 (1965). 
25. 370 U.S. at 344. 
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wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the 
manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own 
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers."26 
Thus the Court recognized that the effect of its decision was to deny 
consumers the benefit of lower prices resulting from th~ economies 
of vertical integration, in favor of retention of businesses which 
would otherwise be excluded as the result of price competition. 
The Philadelphia Bank case further illustrates a tendency on the 
part of the Supreme Court to rely predominantly upon a pluralistic 
concept of competition to evaluate the economic consequences of 
challenged business growth. In that case the Court announced that 
combinations of sellers having an aggregate market share of thirty per 
cent were presumed to be economically unacceptable.27 The record 
before the Court indicated rather clearly that the merger of the 
nvo banks involved would be beneficial to one class of customers-
those who sought commercial banking services in regional, national, 
and international markets. On the other hand, the majority of the 
customers served by the nvo banks were motivated in their demand 
for banking services in considerable measure by shopping conve-
nience in the area in which the banks were located. The merger did 
not diminish the amount of banking facilities, since the new insti-
tution continued to provide deposit account facilities to all con-
sumers desiring them, as had each of the merged institutions. More-
over, a choice among a substantial number of competitors still 
remained. 
For one group, the loss of one potential partner for banking 
transactions was more than offset by the prospect of dealing with 
one bank with loan limits nearly double the limit of either of its 
two predecessors.28 For the other group, there were no additional 
usable services forthcoming from the resulting bank which were not 
provided prior to the merger by both of the two combining banks, 
and there was no evidence that the character of such banking ser-
vices would be changed as a result of the merger. The Court, con-
sistent with the express language in the Clayton Act invalidating 
26. Ibid. 
Z/. See 374- U.S. at 364-65. 
28. Lending limits are both actual and psychological barriers to banking transac-
tions. Of course a· bank must observe its limit, but "smaller" banks may hesitate to 
approach their limits with any single customer or small group of customers, because 
to do so would tie up a disproportionate percentage of funds in a few customers. In 
addition, customers, in borrowing, apparently prefer not to approach a bank's limits; 
thus, a client with a need to borrow $5 million would prefer to deal with a'bank with 
$10 million limits rather than a bank with $5 million or $6 million limits. Brief for 
Appellees, pp. 70-78, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374- U.S. 321 (1963). 
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conduct having anticompetitive effects in any line of commerce in 
any section of the country,29 and consistent with the Court's o·wn 
policy dating from Brown Shoe of analyzing the effects of market 
action in sub-markets, ignored the gains to large customers ac-
customed to dealing regionally, nationally, and internationally, and 
invalidated the merger because of presumed effects in the four-
county area in which the banks involved had offices. The Court also 
ignored the beneficial effects upon the economy of the community 
which such regional, national, and international growth, as well as 
growth in assets of the bank, might produce.30 "We are clear," said 
the Court, "that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to 
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning 
of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed benefi-
cial."31 This is indeed an extraordinary confession. 
In a series of cases coming before the Court after the Philadelphia 
Bank case, determinative significance was attached to the number 
of actual or potential competitors in the market. In United States v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co.,32 the Court invalidated an acquisition of 
one natural gas supplier by another and ordered divestiture, without 
ever indicating how many sellers were actual or potential competi-
tors for the "new increments of demand" in the expanding California 
market for the industrial and household use of gas.83 The record 
clearly indicated that the two merged firms were in fact effective 
competitors for business in the California market, and apparently 
29. Clayton Act § 7 provides in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital 
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall 
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly • 
• • . " 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). 
30. Some relevant economic factors pointing to the propriety of analyzing bank 
mergers in light of regional markets include .the fact that the price of money is deter• 
mined regionally within a national context, and that most borrowers have little bar-
gaining power over the rate of interest. A third factor is the advantages which a large 
bank offers to a region and community from the standpoint of the amount and char• 
acter of its services. There is in this sense a community interest which should not be 
ignored (although it has been) in bank merger cases. 
31. 374 U.S. at 371. 
32. 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
33. Apparently designating the number of competitors was difficult. The district 
court felt that EI Paso had no competition from non-California producers. The Gov-
ernment felt that there were four potential competitors, apparently because in the 
period after the acquisition four companies were seeking certificates of public con• 
venience and necessity to supply the California market. The appellees, while not con• 
ceding that El Paso itself was an effective actual competitor for the California market, 
pointed out that there were in existence many more than four firms that would like 
to supply the California market and therefore many more potential competitors than 
the four companies pointed out by the Government. See Brief for Appellees, pp. 34-
37, United States v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
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the elimination of this competition-the reduction of the number of 
sellers by one-was in itself deemed an unacceptable threat to the 
continued functioning of the competitive mechanism in the market 
involved.84 
The decisions in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,85 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,86 and the Lexington 
Bank case were similar to the result in El Paso. In Penn-Olin the 
Court vacated a judgment against the Government in a case where 
the latter had shmm, at best, that two potential competitors had 
entered a market jointly. The joint venture at most reduced the 
total number of potential competitots by two, while adding one 
actual competitor to the market. Of course, a threat to con;ipetition 
could be found in such circumstances if there had been an extremely 
small number of actual and potential sellers, but the Government 
presented no information concerning the total number of compet-
itors. 
In the Lexington Bank case, on ,the other hand, market statistics 
were gathered and made available. These statistics indicated that 
the challenged activity was a merger by the largest and fourth largest 
banks in a six-bank market. The Court nevertheless chose to empha-
size that "where merging companies are major competitive factors 
in a relevant market, the elimination of significant competition 
between them, by merger or consolidation, itself constitutes a viola-
tion of § I of the Sherman Act."87 The decision, in terms .of statutory 
language, was that the union of the two banks amounted to an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. This is something more than a 
probable substantial lessening of competition, and also represents 
something more than the Court said occurred in Penn-Olin. 
The remaining case in this series, Alcoa, involved vertical inte-
gration achieved through the acquisition in 1959 of the Rome Cable 
Corporation by Alcoa. Alcoa produced aluminum, and both com-
panies manufactured aluminum conductor. In the year prior to 
34. In El Paso, as in the Philadelphia Bank case, another government agency not 
directly charged with maintaining cm;npetition had approved the transaction prior to 
the Supreme Court's contrary action. In Philadelphia Bank the Comptroller of the 
Currency, acting under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 73 Stat. 463 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 215 
(1964), approved the merger, reasoning that an adequate number of banks remained in 
Philadelphia after the merger to serve the local area so that local customers were not 
deprived by the merger of the benefits of competition and that the beneficial effects 
of the consolidation upon international and national competition more than justified 
its approval. In El Paso the Federal Power Commission had approved the acquisition as 
being in the public interest. 
85. 878 U.S. 158 (1964). On .remand, the distrlc~ court dismissed the complaint. 
United. States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965). 
86. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). . . 
37. 876 U.S. at 671-7.2". 
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the merger, Alcoa was the leading producer of aluminum conductor 
with 27.8 per cent of the market; Rome captured 1.3 per cent of the 
market that year. In 1959, there were more than twenty-nine pro-
ducers of aluminum conductor, but by 1963 this number, for prac-
tical purposes, had been reduced to about nventy-three.88 In the 
latter year, five of the six producers of aluminum ingot also produced 
aluminum conductor, and the sixth was considering acquiring facil-
ities for the production of conductor.89 Finally, in 1963 Aluminium, 
Ltd., a Canadian corporation, announced the acquisition of Central 
Cable, one of the largest independent producers of conductor; this 
merger capped a series of acquisitions of independent conductor pro-
ducers by such ingot producers as Anaconda, Olin, Kaiser, Alcoa, 
and Reynolds. Accordingly, it seemed clear that the bulk of con-
ductor production in the future would be by integrated producers. 
In the face of evidence that, as a result of the merger, Rome was 
functioning quite efficiently as a distributor for Alcoa-as part of 
a metrocorporation-and in the face of clear evidence that the role 
of the independent could not be competitively meaningful in a 
market already dominated by integrated producers, the Court 
nevertheless reassigned to Rome (to its undoubted displeasure) the 
task of buying from Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser the aluminum with 
which to make conductor to sell in competition with these three 
integrated producers. In justification, the Court restated that "it is 
the basic premise . . . that competition will be most vital 'when 
there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market 
share.' "40 Similarly, the Court concluded that "Rome seems to us 
the prototype of the small independent that Congress aimed to pre-
serve .... "41 The achievement of tlie economies of vertical inte-
gration for the benefit of consumers was ignored. The competitive 
effectiveness of Alcoa was temporarily diminished by the loss of 
a distributing arm, which was remolded into the form of an inde-
pendent producer of uncertain _competitive effectiveness and fac-
ing problems of higher cost in a market dominated by integrated 
producers.42 
The Supreme Court, in sum, seems clearly committed to a policy 
38. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 18-24, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
377 U.S. 271 (1964). 
39. Id. at 23 n.17. 
40. 377 U.S. at 280 (quoting from United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 874 U.S. 
321, 363 (1963)). 
41. Id. at 281. 
42. Obviously Alcoa has the resources to increase its conductor operations by capital 
expansion, and, if the record in the case is to be believed, it will probably do so. As 
the other ingot producers integrate forward and bring competitive pressures to bear 
upon one another, Rome Cable will be squeezed. If Rome is neither acquired by 
another ingot producer nor in a position to integrate backward, it is conceivable that 
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of measuring challenged marketing arrangements against a highly 
pluralistic competitive norm. The utilization of sub-markets as foci 
for analysis in Brown Shoe and Alcoa,43 the refusal, in Philadelphia 
Bank, to permit economic gains in some markets to offset a mere 
reduction of the number of firms in another as a result of the merger, 
the emphasis on the elimination of competitors as the criterion of 
legal control in El Paso, Alcoa, and Penn-Olin, and the mechanistic 
approach of Philadelphia Bank all indicate the advent of a period 
. of regulation of competition based on the mechanical application 
of a norm of highly pluralistic markets. 
Moreover, the Court's resort to this norm, coupled with its 
evident determination to weed out potentially anticompetitive ac-
tivities in their incipiency and its tendency to measure the effects of 
such activities in narrow lines of commerce or in submarkets, indi-
cates an atmosphere hostile to the growth and development of the 
metrocorporation, even under conditions of effective competition. 
The mechanistic interdiction of corporate growth denies considera-
tion of economic justifications for market activity in general, when 
they are offered in opposition to the ideal of the fragmented market. 
In addition, reliance by the Court, especially in the Philadelphia 
Bank opinion, upon the formula that Congress intended to main-
tain competition by maintaining large numbers of small, indepen-
dent sellers, indicates that the Court is inclined to take an inflexible 
position with regard to economic regulation, on the theory that it is 
the inexorable terms of a statute it is applying rather than an econ-
omy it is regulating. 
IV. EFFEGr OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
ON OTHER TRIBUNALS 
The impact of the decision by the Supreme Court to rely heavily 
on a norm of highly pluralistic competition is of course magnified 
because of the Court's position of leadership among the govern-
it will be pressured out of the field. The net result of the Supreme Court decree may 
be to deny Rome shareholders an opportunity to liquidate their investment at a time 
when adequate compensation was available, to deny to Rome management an oppor-
tunity to upgrade Rome's performance by joining,a metrocorporation, and to deny the 
use of the Rome assets to the persons most eager and able to exploit them. Cf. Oppen-
heim, Small and Big Business: Orientation of Antitrust Points and Counterpoints, 39 
U. DET. L.J. 155, 162 (1961); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clay• 
ton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965). . 
43. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 809 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where the court 
emphasized that Brown Shoe permits the utilization of sub-markets and does not re• 
quire resort to the outer limits of markets definable in terms of product characteristics 
or end uses. See also Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). In the latter 
case the court upheld an FTC order of divestiture running_ against the principals in a 
conglomerate merger, although there were no markets in which the acquired and 
acquiring companies actually competed prior to the acquisition. 
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mental bodies . concerned with economic regulation. In fact, the 
major impact of the Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank opinions in 
future litigation will occur in the lower federal courts and in the 
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission. Two cases will suffice 
to illustrate this point . 
. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,44 the Commission dissolved a 
vertical integration by ordering divestiture by Reynolds of Arrow 
Brands, a converter of aluminum foil which sold to florist supply 
houses. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed, relying upon the Brown Shoe concept of sub-markets to find 
that florist foil formed a product sub-market in the general market 
for converted aluminum foil. This definitional exercise enabled the 
court to distinguish eight converters of foil for the florist trade from 
among two hundred converters of foil for other uses. 
Arrow sold about one third of the foil purchased by florist supply 
houses in 1956. The acquisition of Arrow by Reynolds foreclosed 
Reynolds' competitors from serving Arrow as a customer, though the 
facilities of Arrow continued to serve Arrow's customers. The court 
stated: 
The truer picture of anticompetitive effect emerges [when one 
views the post-acquisition posture of the eight converters of foil 
for the florist trade]- ... Arrow's assimilation into Reynolds' 
enormous capital structure and resources gave Arrow an im-
mediate advantage over its competitors who were contending 
for a share of the market for florist foil. The power of the "deep 
pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist foil suppliers in 
a competitive group when previously no company was very 
large . . . opened the possibility and power to sell at prices 
approximating cost or below and thus to undercut and ravage 
the less affiuent competition.45 
The court concluded by noting that the FTC had adequately demon-
strated the likelihood of a harmful effect by showing that after the 
acquisition Arrow had in fact provided foil at lower prices. 
The decision seems quixotic. The court protected the public 
from the ravages of efficiency by preserving competition in a market 
which could well be eliminated entirely from the standpoint of 
efficient use of resources. Foil converters merely buy large rolls of 
foil from producers, break the rolls down into small lots, and sell 
the product to small purchasers. Converters came into existence only 
because in the early stage of developing the market for foil, foil 
producers preferred not to sell in small lots. If the foil producers had 
decided in the beginning to sell in small lots, the need for con-
44. !109 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
· 45. Id. at 229-80. 
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verters would never have arisen. Eventually Reynolds began back-
tracking and preparing to supply all users of foil, both large and 
small. However, when it did so by acquiring the assets of Arrow and 
eliminating the converter's profit margin from the price of foil 
to small users, it was found to be acting illegally. Of course, if 
Reynolds duplicates Arrow's facilities there will be no illegality. 
There will be only a needless waste of. resources and a needless 
denial to Arrow of the proceeds of the sale of its business. 
Ekco Products Co. v. FTC46 is the second example of the impact 
in the lower courts of the Supreme Court's announced preference for 
pluralism in competition. In that case Ekco, a large diversified enter-
prise of the sort which is a potential .entrant in many markets, ac-
quired the McCI.intock Company. Ekco had no familiarity with 
McClintock's business of manufacturing and distributing commer-
cial meat-handling equipment; the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit therefore characterized the merger as conglomerate. Through-
out most of its history, McClintock had had a virtual monopoly posi-
tion. After the acquisition, McClintock began receiving some com-
petition, but eventually it bought out its most effective competitor, 
which, it must be stated, probably entered the field improvidently 
and certainly left it willingly. 
With respect to McClintock, the main impact of the acquisition 
was to relieve it and its management of a stifling loan agreement, to 
place it in a financial position to be creative and innovative, and, 
as the court tirelessly emphasized, to permit -it to buy out its most 
effective competitor. The overall effect of the acquisition, however, 
was that a small business severely hampered with chronic cash short-
ages was given a degree of financial independence and a resulting 
flexibility in meeting the changing demands of space-age consumers 
by joining forces ·with a larger, diversified organization; yet divesti-:-
ture was ordered.47 
V. DECEPTIVE BASES UNDERLYING GENERAL PROHIBITORY RULES 
As Professor Turner has pointed out, general norms such as the 
thirty per cent rule of Philadelphia Bank, the rule that it is illegal to 
foreclose a substantial share of the market, or, for that matter, the 
rule that effective competition requires a fragmented market are jus-
tified if one can conclude that the consequences of being wrong 
about the probable results of applying such rules are less serious than 
46. 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). 
47. For a contrary analysis in a somewhat similar situation, see Smith-Victor Corp. 
v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. ill. 1965). 
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the consequences of adopting no rule whatever.48 It seems clear that 
the Court has in fact made the judgment that unyielding and early 
application of a pluralistic norm to marketing arrangements to halt 
the development of "unacceptable" market structures will benefit 
the general public, even though in concrete cases it may not benefit 
consumers. 
In addition, several other justifications for general prohibitory 
rules are occasionally offered. First, it is felt that a liberal dose of 
pluralism by present governmental policy makers Gudges) will avoid 
a need for economic planning in the future.40 Second, it is said will-
ingness on the part of the Court to halt a trend before it starts is in 
some sense a necessary reaction to the judiciary's traditional reluc-
tance to break up market power once it is acquired.00 Third, it is as-
sumed decision-making under general prohibitory rules requires less 
evidence and consequently less of the time of government attorneys, 
so that a wider enforcement of the antitrust laws becomes possible. 
A related justification is thought to be that general prohibitory rules 
infuse a desirable increment of certainty and predictability into an-
titrust enforcement. 
The notion that pervasive interference by courts to preserve 
fragmented markets serves not only an economic goal but also the 
higher social goal of preserving a self-policing system free of an 
abundance of supervisory political machinery is built on the premise 
that, absent early interference, the inevitable economic progression 
in an initially free society is from competition to monopoly, to reg-
ulation, and finally to socialization. It seems highly probable, how-
ever, that in reality most markets are at present self-policing systems 
and that the pattern of structural changes is both multi-directional 
and reciprocating, in the sense that price competition gives way to 
parallel pricing, which in turn gives way to competition in innova-
tion, which leads in turn to new price competition in the new prod-
ucts. Or the appearance of price parallelism may induce entry by a 
diversified or vertically integrated corporation, resulting in cost cut-
ting and price competition. In the event that the progression ever 
leads to monopoly, duopoly, or an unacceptable form of oligopoly, 
then interference by the courts to break up firms and fragment mar-
kets is justified. 
48. See Turner, supra note 42, at 1319-20. 
49. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM, L. REv. 877 (1965). 
50. See generally Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion7, 
50 VA. L. REv. 413 (1964). Cases evidencing judicial hesitancy to break up firms include: 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp, 83!1 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
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It appears probable, however, that the number of instances in 
which self-policing systems break down completely is slight and that 
the resources of the courts and the agencies are more· than adequate 
to the task of handling those cases. The net result of withholding 
interference until the competitive regulator breaks down completely 
would be an enlargement of individual liberty, in the sense that 
market forces are permitted to function without governmental inter-
ference until it becomes quite clear that the self-policing market 
forces have been overcome, in which case there should be interven-
tion of control to restore them. 
The justification for general prohibitory rules based on notions 
that antitrust enforcement will be rendered less time-consuming and 
more predictable is even more illusory, for in the cases that signal 
the decision to rely on a pluralistic norm there are equally probative 
indicators which suggest that the key to Supreme Court action rests 
with the definition of the relevant market in which challenged 
activity will be measured.51 The power to define the relevant market 
is in most· cases one that can be exercised . with considerable 
latitude. Indeed, by resorting to an expansive definition of relevant 
markets, the Court has left open the possibility of justifying, in a 
particular case, a market arrangement which departs from the 
pluralistic model. 
In the Tampa Electric case, it will be recalled,52 the buyer wished 
to obligate itself by a :i;equirements contract to deal with a single 
source of coal for a period of twenty years in order to reduce market 
risk in the supply and price of its basic raw material and thereby 
protect its capital investment and the consumers' interest. The total 
consumption of coal in peninsular Florida was about 700,000 tons 
per year-a quantity which approximated the 1959 requirements of 
Tampa Electric. The effect of the contract was to preclude over seven 
hundred coal producers who could serve that region from compet-
ing for nearly fifty per cent of the Florida market during a period 
of nventy years. The lower courts ruled that the contract foreclosed 
competition from a substantial share .of the Florida market for 
coal and hence was unenforceable as a violation of the antitrust 
Iaws.58 
In view of its own rule that it is illegal per se to foreclose com-
51. Resort to mechanical rules of the type announced in Philadelphia Bank will 
provoke increased attention to market definition by attorneys in counseling and 
litigation and by courts. See Blake, Mergers and United States Anti-Trust l.Aw, 12 INT'L 
&: COMP. L.Q. 78, 85, 94 (Supp. No. 6, 1963). 
52. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
53. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn, 1958), afj'd, 
276 F,2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960). 
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petitors from any substantial share of a market, it appears that the 
Supreme Court should hav~ affirmed the nullification of the con-
tract. However, the Court noted the importance of the interest of the 
utility company in having the assurance of a steady and ample supply 
of coal for a long term. The Court apparently was unable to give 
effect to this interest under any formal rule of law other than by 
shifting the relevant market from that of competition among sellers 
generally for Florida coal consumers to that of competition among 
coal producers in Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Alabama, Ohio, and Illinois-the states in which the coal 
for Florida buyer~ originated. Only in this way could a contract 
covering a substantial fifty per cent of the market consisting of coal 
consumed in peninsular Florida be identified as an innocuous ar-
rangement extending to an insubstantial 0.77 per cent of coal pro-
duced and sold in the Appalachian area market. 
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court should be caught in a 
vise of unrealistic rule formulation from which it can extricate itself 
only by such manipulative techniques in selecting the relevant 
market. Indeed, the pervasive rule that it is illegal per se to 
preclude competitors from any substantial market prevented the 
Court from concentrating on the heart of the problem before it-the 
real economic or marketing interests involved. Only by shifting the 
view of the relevant market from that of competition for buyers in 
Florida to that of competition among sellers in the Appalachian 
coal region and adjacent areas could the desirable marketing situ-
ation be allowed to survive the strictures of the Court-made law. 
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,G4 a firm 
holding a monopoly in a morning newspaper market used this 
power to compel advertisers to buy space in its evening newspaper 
by selling advertising only when it was placed in both publications. 
Obviously, this requirement could be viewed as a foreclosure of 
co:rµpeting newspapers from access to a substantial share of the 
market. From the standpoint of sales of newspapers, there are two 
separate markets: morning and evening. By evening, a morning 
newspaper is virtually waste paper; no one will buy it. For this 
reason, the publisher's "unit" advertising plan restrained purchasers 
of advert~sing space from exercising free choice, since it represented 
a use of the monopoly power in the morning newspaper market to 
exert leverage in the evening market. Nevertheless, in holding for 
54. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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the defendant the Court ignored the abuse of power in the ~orning 
newspaper market and held that the relevant market was that of 
advertising space in both morning and evening newspapers, in 
which the Times-Picayune enjoyed only forty per cent of the sales.55 
The interests of buyers of advertising space were simply overlooked, 
since the methodology applied was one of searching for a rule of 
decision in "market" terms rather than marketing relationships and 
consumer interest. 
Obviously, to the extent judicial decisions in this area turn pri-
marily on market definition,58 they will also tum on non-economic 
criteria. Thus, the acquisition by DuPont of a block of General 
Motors stock was illegal because it foreclosed competition in the 
market for automobile finishes and fabrics,57 despite the fact that 
manufacturers of finishes and fabrics for other purposes would ap-
pear to be potential short-run competitors. 
Moreover, judicial definitions of markets are casuistic. The 
judicial process has not yet had, and will not have even in the far 
future, an opportunity to reduce the general concept of "relevant 
market" to a tool which is workable in even a small percentage of 
the instances to -which it applies. In the resulting system for main-
taining competition, the acceptability of a particular form of market 
activity turns on the definition of the market in terms of time, 
space, product, or service. The flexibility provided by this system has 
permitted the Supreme Court to rule that an acquisition by a food 
processer of a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and dehydrated 
garlic (a merger which the FTC regarded as a restraint on competi-
tion in both the dehydrated onion and dehydrated garlic markets) 
could be measured in light of the market for dehydrated onion and 
garlic.68 This system has also permitted courts to rule both that inter-
industry competition between glass and metal containers is sufficient 
to warrant treating as a relevant market the combined glass and 
metal container industries and all end uses for which they compete, 59 
and that Alcoa's control of the aluminum market could be deter-
55. Compare United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), where 
the Court recognized the leverage which dominance in the market for first-run moving 
pictures makes possible in exploiting the second-run market. 
56. Many commentators suggest that the cases often tum exclusively on market 
definition. See Blake, supra note 51; Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. 
Corporate Mergers, 71 FORTUNE 165, 174 (Tan. 1965); Lanzillotti, Market Structure 'and 
Antitrust Vulnerability, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 853, 859 (1963). 
57. See United States v. E: I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
58. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 502 (1965). 
_59. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See also Handler 
&: Robinson, supra note 56, at 174. · · 
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mined in terms of the production of virgin aluminum without 
considering secondary or reclaimed material.60 ' 
The significance of market definition is nowhere better illus-
trated than in the Philadelphia Bank opinion. In that case the Court 
had determined that commercial banking was the product market 
in which to measure the challenged acquisition, although institu-
tions other than commercial banks provide many similar services. 
In defining the geographic limits of this market, the Court recognized 
that the area in which the banks had their offices did not correspond 
exactly to the area of competition, for although small depositors and 
borrowers were likely to find themselves confined to their neighbor-
hood by the nature of the banking business and their own lack of 
mobility, large borrowers and depositors often transacted banking 
business at locations other than their home community.61 The Court 
also noted: 
[T]hat in banking the relevant geographical market is a 
function of each separate customer's economic scale means 
simply that a workable compromise must bB found: some fair 
intermediate delineation which avoids the indefensible ex-
tremes of drawing the market either so expansively as to make 
the effect of the merger upon competition seem insignificant, 
because only the very largest bank customers are taken into 
account in defining the market, or so narrowly as to place ap-
pellees in different markets, because only the smallest customers 
are considered. 62 
In other words, there had to be a market which was the market for 
decision-making purposes, and that market was to be defined on the • 
basis of a "workable compromise" or "some fair intermediate 
delineation." Apparently the possibility of a market analysis which 
would reveal the best means of promoting the consumer and com-
munity interest did not occur to the Court, which permitted the 
outcome to tum on the impact of the merger upon only one class 
of consumers served by the bank. 
Market definition is an extremely flexible tool in the hands of 
a court-so flexible, in fact, that the apparent certainty and pre-
dictability of result which might be expected to flow from the 
mathematical measure of the Philadelphia Bank case is rendered 
meaningless by the unpredictable discretion of a judge. Market 
60. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). But 
see the district court opinion on the remedy, United States v. Aluminum Co, of Amer-
ica, 91 F. Supp. 333, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
61. See 374 U.S. at 359 n.36, 360 n.37, 361. 
62. Id. at 361. (Emphasis added.) 
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definition is a requisite of antitrust analysis, but it should proceed 
in as scientific and dispassionate a manner as possible, without 
becoming a manipulative instrument for the covert achievement of 
some other unexpressed goal. The totality of the market impact of 
questioned marketing arrangements should be examined, and the 
tendency of such arrangements to promote economical utilization 
of resources and the consumer interest should be weighed. Finally, 
the reasoning processes of the judge should be open, explicit, and 
directly related to the problem which he considers crucial. 
VI. SUMMING UP 
A. Constructive Nonintervention 
When the interests of an industry, as well as the maintenance of 
pluralistic competition, demand consideration by regulatory agencies, 
the result is frequently the creation of specialized agencies such as 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission. The interests of labor and of corporate stock-
holders are safeguarded by other equally specialized administrative 
agencies. However, the peculiar province and function of antitrust 
regulation is to secure the consumer interest, and the ultimate 
value of such regulation is maximum consumer welfare.63 If .a par-
ticular market situation is providing substantial consumer value 
realization, then there is no basis for interfering on the ground that 
it does not reflect highly pluralistic competition, unless it can be 
clearly demonstrated that such interference will result in consumer 
or other values superior to those currently provided. Where the 
challenged marketing arrangement is the result of corporate growth 
by acquisition or merger, indications that increased value realization 
is likely to be provided include the achievement of economies of 
vertical integration, the achievement of a corporate structure which 
enables the production of a diverse but related group of better, or 
less costly, products, and the development of an organization which 
permits research, innovation, efficiencies in production and market-
ing, and intelligent, informed decision making-the achievement, 
in short, of corporate growth which is capable of better market 
performance and greater consumer satisfaction. 
The foregoing justifications for corporate acquisitions and 
mergers are stated in terms of consumer-want satisfaction, and are 
63. As Professor Bork has pointed out, if competition were the ultimate value, pol-
icy would require the atomization of society to the point of forbidding partnerships. 
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 
74 YALE L.J. 775, 832 (1965). 
798 M ic!zigan Law Review [Vol, 64:777 
siµrilar to the performance justifications listed by Judge Wyzanski 
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.64 Such standards 
of performance permit a particular market or marketing arrange-
ment to be evaluated not in terms of the abstract proposition that 
a market populated with many small sellers will lead to maximized 
consumer welfare, but rather in terms of the pragmatic proposition 
that a particular arrangement has increased, is increasing, or will 
increase consumer welfare. This method of evaluation requires that 
if a particular marketing arrangement is performing well, it should 
be permitted to continue to. operate; it also requires that the ap-
plication of an abstract postulate of economic .theory be withheld 
until the arrangement fails to provide the desired consumer satis-
factions. Moreover, this method requires that, until it falters, the 
agencies charged with maintaining competition should be content 
with increasing value realization, and should withhold the question 
whether present consumer satisfaction is at the optimum leveI.0G 
B. Suggestions for Positive Regulation 
In the final analysis, it is not markets which should be the 
primary concern of those charged with maintaining competition, but 
instead the performance of business organizations in maximizing 
consumer values. The goal of maximizing consumer values is in 
tum one which can be defined in concrete terms only when it is 
placed in context with a number of other goals. Indeed, the goal 
should not be maximum value realization, but rather optimum value 
realization. 
The ideal system for purposes of antitrust regulation is one 
that seeks to achieve an optimum combination of two variables. 
The first of these variables is the action of business organizations in 
searching for consumer values, in shaping their products and 
services to enable the realization of consumer values, and in reducing 
costs and passing the benefit on to consumers. The second variable 
is the charac.ter of competition in the relevant market. There should 
l;>e no insistence that an oligopolistic market be changed to a 
pluralistic market when current performance by sellers in the 
market is marked by innovation, efficiency, and orientation to the 
interests of consumers. While the maintenance of competitive 
64. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
65. To judge the defects of a marketing arrangement and neglect its virtues, and 
to judge its defects by what would supposedly happen under perfect competition, "is 
not only npt feasible but is, in terms of a present-day economy, meaningless," CLARK, 
COMPEI'ITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 214 (1961). 
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markets remains a sine qua non of public control, this goal cannot 
be conceived in mechanistic terms as a complete end in itself. 
Instead, the search must be for the optimal practical combination 
of performance in promoting consumer value realization and growth 
of personality on the one hand, and free competition in free markets 
on the other hand. Decisions should be macle on the basis of a 
balancing of the totality of interests of consumers in the several 
markets and sub-markets affected, and should not tum solely on 
the impact of arrangements in a single sub-market affecting merely 
a small minority of consumers. Means other than condemning ar-
rangements in their entirety should be found for protecting the 
interests of those consumers. 
C. Conclusion 
The assumption that all is well with the world when competitive 
markets are preserved ignores the reality that the vitality of the 
American economy is a product of many forces and that its preser-
vation and growth cannot be left to so simple a formula. The ex-
traordinary accomplishments of the American economy are a product 
of the pragmatic philosophy of the American way of life: means are 
judged by their consequences. The metrocorporation-a mechanism 
for value realization by important segments of our: society, not 
merely by its "o,;vners"-is the dominant actor in our economic life. 
Markets are more frequently oligopolistic than not, at least for the 
bulk of our national production of manufactured goods. This kind 
of an economy was brought into being and continues to develop 
because it provides the kind of world that we want. We like the 
satisfactions it brings to labor, stockholders, management, and 
consumers, as well as to the public at large. 
To attempt to establish the model of highly pluralistic competi-
tion as the ideal model for purposes of public policy and decision 
making is to substitute a crude symbolic representation for a com-
plex reality. Moreover, the model shunts to the periphery of vision 
the realities of corporate performance and consumer values. We do 
not necessarily need the large corporation that is a jerry-built structure 
of enterprises selected for tax advantages or bargain-basement ac-
quisition costs. However, we do need metrocorporations (1) embody-
ing a diversity of enterprises that possess a common unity or mission 
and an ability to add strength to one another, (2) having the goal 
of growth by serving the consumer and other group interests which 
take part in its system of action, and (3) serving as potential· entrants 
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in a multitude of markets, including markets having significant 
barriers to entry for ordinary firms. 
The antitrust laws should not be used to strike down corporate 
growth resulting in greater efficiency and creativity in serving 
consumers, so long as effective competition remains. Until recently, 
competitors were allowed to achieve through merger the economies 
of vertical integration and mass production, together with the 
benefits in innovation flowing from research of the magnitude which 
only large-scale enterprise can support. The image of our economy 
as one of business organizations so structured and managed as to 
serve the consumer interest to the greatest possible degree, yet subject 
to competition in free markets, should be the ideal image for anti-
trust law enforcement. Such a structure of competition has greater 
importance for consumers and, indeed, for the vitality and growth 
of our economy, than the goal of fragmenting competitors into large 
numbers of small units. 
